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Abstract 
This study distinguishes the weak fairness property from the strong fairness 
property which is necessary in the quantum key agreement (QKA) and shows that most 
of the existing QKAs cannot achieve the strong fairness property with a key 
manipulation problem. To solve this problem, a model which describes the way to 
design a QKA with the strong fairness property is proposed. Based on the model, an 
example QKA is presented. Security analyses show that the proposed QKA is effective 
to resist not only outsider’s eavesdropping attack but also insider’s key manipulation. 
Keywords: Key manipulation; Quantum key agreement; Quantum cryptography; 
Fairness property; 
1 Introduction 
Key distribution (KD) is one of the most useful cryptographic research topics where 
the involved participants can securely share a secret key which can be used for further 
secure communications. Most researches of KD focus on how to achieve the security 
property (share a secure key among the involved participants). However, in the KD, 
the content of the shared secret key is usually determined by one of participants and 
then distributed to the others. Different from the KD, the key agreement (KA) protocols 
try to let each participant to contribute his/her influence to the final shared key. The first 
secure and fair KA protocol is proposed by Diffe and Hellman in 1976 [1]. Subsequently, 
several researches about KA have been proposed and the research results have been 
widely used, e.g. in Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) [2] and in Transport Layer Security 
(TLS) [2]. In order to standardize the KA, the International Organization for 
Standardization proposed a rigorous definition of KA in ISO/IEC DIS 11770-3 as 
follows [3].  
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KA is a process of establishing a shared secret key between entities in such a way 
that neither of them can predetermine the value of that key. (NOTE: By predetermine 
it is meant that neither entity A nor entity B can, in a computationally efficient way, 
choose a smaller key space and force the computed key in the protocol to fall into that 
key space.) 
That is, in KA, the final shared key must be determined by all the involved 
participants. Any proper subset of the participants cannot determine or manipulate the 
final shared key alone. Hence, the KA protocols should not only achieve the security 
property but also achieve the fairness property. To achieve the security property, these 
proposed KA protocols are designed based on computation complexity. However, with 
the development of quantum computer which has excellent computational power, these 
proposed KA protocols face serious secure challenges [4, 5]. Hence, several researches 
of quantum key agreement protocol (QKA) where the security is guaranteed by the laws 
of quantum mechanics have been proposed. 
In 2004, Zhou et al. [6] employed quantum teleportation technique and maximally 
entangled states to propose the first QKA. They claimed their protocol can ensure the 
participants to share a fair and secure key. However, Tsai et al. [7] commented that 
Zhou et al.’s protocol is susceptible to insider attacks. That is, a participant has the 
ability to fully control the secret key without being detected by the other. Therefore, the 
fairness property are not satisfied in Zhou et al’s scheme. In 2010, Chong et al. [8] 
proposed a QKA based on the BB84 protocol [9]. They pointed out that a malicious 
participant, Bob, can control one bit of the key in their protocol. In 2013, several multi-
party QKAs [10-12] were presented, which allow numerous participants to take part in 
their communication. Subsequently, Huang et al. [13] proposed a new QKA using 
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs and single-particle measurements. In 2014, 
Huang et al. [14] showed Sun et al.’s protocol cannot ensure each participant to share a 
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secure and fair key and pointed out that it is necessary to concern the fairness property 
in the classical postprocessing process where each participant corrects the raw key to 
obtain the final key. Without designing a fair classical postprocessing process, the final 
shared key cannot be directly used in real life. Subsequently, Huang et al. [13] proposed 
a method to share EPR pairs over two collective-noise channels and Yuan et al. [15] 
designed an identity authentication method. Both of the methods can improve the 
fairness of QKAs in the classical postprocessing process. Obviously, all the existing 
related researches of QKA [8, 10-14, 16-37] try to achieve both of the security property 
and the fairness property.  
To further explain the concept of the security and the fairness property clearly, it 
indeed requires to define the term ‘security’ and the term ‘fairness’ carefully. Moreover, 
according to the definition in ISO/IEC DIS 11770-3, the existing definition of ‘fairness’ 
in QKA is not rigorous. This not rigorous definition makes most of the exiting ‘fairness’ 
QKA protocols cannot achieve the real fairness property. To solve these problems, this 
paper proposes the security property, the weak fairness property (existing definition 
of ‘fairness’ in QKAs) and the strong fairness property (new definition of ‘fairness’ 
based on ISO/IEC DIS 11770-3) and defines respectively as follows: 
 Security property: The outside eavesdropper cannot get any useful information of the 
final shared key without being detected and the protocol must ensure the involved 
participants to share an identical key. 
 Weak fairness property: Each participant contributes his/her influence to the final 
shared key.  
 Strong fairness property: Each participant does not have a single bit of advantage 
over the others to determine the final shared key. That is, none of the participant can 
manipulate even one bit of the final key. 
According to these definitions, QKAs in [8, 10-14, 16-22, 24-30, 32-35, 38] 
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cannot achieve the strong fairness property. That is, in the protocols, a legitimate but 
malicious participant has the chance to derive the final shared secret key first during 
the public discussion process. If the malicious participant does not like the negotiated 
shared secret key to be the final session key, he/she can deliberately abort the protocol 
and then impute the error to an outside eavesdropper without being detected. By this 
way, these QKAs are vulnerable to a key manipulation problem, which certainly fails 
the strong fairness definition in a QKA. The purpose of this paper is to present a solution 
model to solve this problem. By using the proposed solution model, the designed QKAs 
can achieve strong fairness property. For convenience, here we just take Huang et al.’s 
[13] QKA as an example to demonstrate the key manipulation problem in detail. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews Huang et al.’s 
QKA and subsequently describes the key manipulation problem. Section 3 introduces 
the proposed model, and presents a two-party QKA as well. Besides, security and 
fairness analyses of the proposed QKA are provided. Finally, a conclusion is given in 
Section 4. 
2 Discussion of fairness property in existing QKAs 
According to our research, several existing QKAs [8, 10-14, 16-22, 24-30, 32-35, 
38] have a key manipulation problem which makes these QKAs cannot achieve the 
strong fairness property. Here, as an example, we use Huang et al.’s QKA protocol [13] 
to demonstrate it. 
2.1 Review of Huang et al.’s QKA 
Assume that there are two participants, Alice and Bob, who want to share a fair n-
bit secret key by using EPR pairs and single-particle measurements. The two 
polarization bases, Z-basis ( 0 ,  1 ) and X-basis ( ,    ), are used as the initial 
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states of single particles, where  
1
0 1
2
    and  
1
0 1
2
    . The 
protocol proceeds as follow: 
Step 1 Alice generates a sequence of n Bell states,  1 2,  , ,  nS s s s , in 
                  
1 1
00 11
2 2
         
where  ,  i ii A Bs q q , for 1,  2,   ,  i n . She divides S   into two 
sequences  iA AS q  and  iB BS q , for 1,  2,   ,  i n . 
Step 2 To prevent the transmitted particles from eavesdropping attacks, Alice 
prepares a sufficient number of decoy particles randomly in one of the four 
polarization states  0 ,  1 ,  ,     . Then she randomly inserts these 
decoy particles into the sequence 
BS  (denote the new sequence as 
*
BS ) and 
sends the sequence 
*
BS  to Bob. 
Step 3 After confirming that Bob has received the sequence 
*
BS , Alice announces 
the positions and the initial states of the decoy particles to Bob. Based on 
Alice’s information, Bob picks the decoy particles out from 
*
BS  and 
measures these decoy particles in the corresponding bases of the initial states. 
Then, Bob compares his measurement results with the initial states. If the 
error rate is higher than a pre-defined threshold, Alice and Bob abort the 
protocol and start a new one. Otherwise, they continue the next step. 
Step 4 Bob determines a string  0,1
n
C  and sends it to Alice. Based on the 
string C , they perform single-particle measurements on each particle. 
More precisely, if the i-th bit of C  is “0”, Alice and Bob perform Z-basis 
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measurements on the particle 
i
Aq  and 
i
Bq , respectively. Otherwise, they 
perform X-basis measurements. If the measurement result is 0  or   ( 1  
or  ), Alice and Bob can derive a value “0” (“1”) as their shared key bit. 
It appears that the shared secret key cannot be determined alone by any one of the 
participants because both participants measure all the particles with identical bases and 
subsequently get the same measurement results. However, the next section will show 
that in fact, one of the participants has the advantage to manipulate the final key. 
2.2 Key manipulation problem 
Suppose that there is a malicious participant, Bob, who attempts to control one-bit 
of the shared secret key. In Step 3 of Huang et al.’s protocol, Bob separates the decoy 
particles from the sequence 
*
BS  after knowing the positions of the decoy particles in 
Step3. Bob preserves these decoy particles in quantum storage and instead directly 
measures the remaining particles (i.e., 
BS ) based on the string C that he determined in 
Step 4. As a result, Bob can derive the shared secret key earlier than Alice. Suppose for 
some reason, Bob prefers the first bit of the negotiated key to be “0”, but in fact it turns 
out to be a “1”. Then he can deliberately notify Alice that the comparison result in the 
public discussion is negative. Accordingly, the protocol will be aborted and they will 
start a new one until Bob gets the desired key bit to be a “1”. In this way, even though 
the unpredictability of the entangled Bell states is applied for the key negotiation, Bob 
can still completely determine one bit of the key or even the whole key bits. 
It would be futile even if the eavesdropper detection in the public discussion is 
modified to be performed by Alice instead of by Bob as in the original design. To 
explain this, let us modify the public discussion (Step 3) as the following: 
Step 3* After confirming that Bob has already received 
*
BS , Alice announces the 
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positions and the bases of the decoy particles to Bob. Based on Alice’s 
announcement, Bob measures these decoy particles and then sends his 
measurement results back to Alice. Alice compares Bob’s reports with the 
initial states that she prepared. If the error rate exceeds the pre-defined 
threshold, then the protocol will be aborted. Otherwise, they continue to the 
next step. 
In this case, Bob still can perform the similar manipulation plot as below: upon 
receiving Alice’s announcement, Bob preserves the decoy photons in the quantum 
storage. Then he directly measures the sequence 
BS  based on the stringC . Thus, Bob 
can first derive the shared secret key. In this regard, if Bob prefers this shared key, he 
will follow the protocol. Otherwise, Bob sends fake measurement results to Alice for 
eavesdropping check and definitely the comparison cannot be passed. As a result, the 
protocol will be started again until Bob gets a desired key. 
By this way, the malicious participant, Bob, can easily destroy the fairness of the 
protocol by publishing a fake message during the public discussion. However, Alice 
has no way of detecting this fraudulence. Obviously, Bob can easily manipulate the 
final key of a key-agreement key and attribute all the fault to an eavesdropper without 
being detected. Similarly, the existing QKAs [8, 10-13, 39, 40] also have the similar 
problem. For simplicity, we omit the discussion here. 
3 Design of QKAs with strong fairness 
This section first proposes a solution model to avoid the key manipulation problem 
which we have demonstrated in Section 2.2. Then, we present an example of QKA 
based on the proposed model in Section 3.2. Security analyses of the proposed QKA 
are also provided in Section 3.3. Moreover, we discuss how the proposed scheme 
accomplishes the strong fairness property. 
9 
3.1 Solution model for QKA with strong fairness 
Based on the discussion in Section 2 , we summarize that in order to achieve the 
strong fairness property, a QKA has to satisfy the following requirements in the 
designing phase: (1) No participant is able to derive the final secret key before the 
public discussion is finished (2) Any manipulation on the shared key will be detected 
by the other participants. 
Based on the above requirements, the proposed solution model for a fair QKA is 
divided into three stages as follows (also shown in Figure 1): 
 
Figure 1. Solution model for a QKA with fairness 
Particle Exchange Stage: the participants send out the sequence of particles or receive 
the corresponding sequence in this stage. It is required that every participant has to 
complete the particles transmission here. 
Public Discussion Stage: the participants check the security of channel in this stage. 
This stage makes sure that the transmitted sequences are free from the outside 
eavesdropping attacks. 
Key Negotiation Stage: the participants help each other to construct or derive the final 
secret key (here transmission of additional classical messages is needed). Note that the 
shared secret key can only be derived by the participants in this stage. 
 The main idea of the model is that the shared secret key cannot be derived until 
the participants have confirmed that the channel is free from the eavesdropping attacks. 
In other words, a QKA with strong fairness has to prevent any participant from 
obtaining the shared secret key before completing the public discussion. 
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3.2 New QKA based on the proposed solation model 
Based on the above solution model, we design a two-party QKA as an example. 
Suppose that there are two parties, Alice and Bob, who would like to negotiate a shared 
secret key. Here, a hash function H [41, 42] is used for eavesdropping check and for 
verifying the integrity of a secret message. Based on the property of a hash function, 
one-bit error in the input will cause significant changes in the output and can be detected. 
This property is very useful in checking message integrity if the quantum channel is 
reliable or ideal. Moreover, Alice and Bob agree on the following encoding rules: a 
binary value “0” is encoded as one of the two polarization states  0 ,   and a value 
“1” is encoded as  1 ,  , and vice versa. Now, let us introduce the process of the 
new QKA in detail as follows (shown in Figure 2): 
 
Figure 2. Proposed QKA with fairness 
Particle Exchange Stage: 
Step 1 Alice and Bob separately determine an n-bit string 
AK  and BK  as their 
private key. They use the hash function H to generate m-bit hash values 
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 A Ah H K  and  B Bh H K , respectively. 
Step 2 Alice generates two sequences of single particles 
AC  and AS  from Ah  
and 
AK  based on the pre-agreed rules respectively. Then, she randomly 
reorders the particles of 
AS  (denoted as AS
 ). Note that the original order of 
the sequence 
AS
  is known to nobody but Alice. Besides, Alice prepares a 
sufficient number of decoy particles randomly in one of four polarization 
states  0 ,  1 ,  ,    . She randomly inserts these decoy particles into 
the sequences 
AC  and AS
  (denote the new sequences as 
*
AC  and 
*
AS
 ). 
After that, Alice sends the sequences 
*
AC  and 
*
AS
  to Bob via a quantum 
channel. Following the same process, Bob sends Alice two sequences 
*
BC  
and *
BS
  as well. 
Public Discussion Stage: 
Step 3 After receiving the sequences, Alice and Bob acknowledge each other via an 
authenticated classical channel. Then, they publish the positions and the 
measurement bases of the decoy particles. Based on the published 
information, the receiver measures the decoy particles and subsequently 
returns the measurement results back to the original sender. Now, Alice and 
Bob check whether the received measurement results are matched to the 
initial states they prepared. If the error rate is higher than a pre-defined 
threshold, the protocol will be aborted. Otherwise, Alice and Bob can 
confirm that the channel is free from the eavesdropping attacks. 
Key Generation Stage: 
Step 4 Alice announces the bases of the remaining particles (i.e., 
AC  and AS
 ) and 
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the original order of 
AS
  to Bob. Bob recovers the sequence 
AS  from AS
  
and measures 
AS  and AC  based on Alice’s announcement. Therefore, Bob 
can derive Alice’s 
AK
  and 
Ah . Follow the same process, Alice can also 
obtain 
BK
  and 
Bh . 
Step 5 Alice and Bob respectively obtain 
Bh
   from  BH K    and Ah    from 
 AH K   and then compare the results to Bh  and Ah , respectively. In this 
regard, if there is a participant who finds that his/her comparison result is 
negative, he/she can deduce that the other one performs some illegitimate 
operations to affect the negotiated key (sending a wrong permutation, for 
instance). Otherwise, he/she can confirm the derived key is correct and 
reliable. 
Step 6 Alice and Bob can construct a shared raw key as
A BK K K   . 
Step 7 Finally, Alice and Bob obtain the final secret key 
 . .K Privacy Amplification K  . 
3.3 Security analyses and fairness analyses 
Here, we show that the proposed QKA is secure against both the outsider 
eavesdropping attack and insider attack. In addition, we discuss how the proposed 
scheme satisfies the requirements of the strong fairness property. 
3.3.1 Security against outsider attack 
In this part, we use several well-known attacks (measure and resend attack, 
correlation-elicitation attack) as examples to show that the proposed QKA is secure 
against the outsider eavesdropping attack. Moreover, we prove that the proposed 
protocol is free from information leakage. 
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a. Intercept and Resend Attack 
Suppose that there is an outside eavesdropper, Eve, who possesses powerful 
quantum capability and intends to acquire the shared secret key between Alice and Bob. 
In this regard, Eve has to obtain Alice and Bob’s private key. More precisely, Eve 
intercepts the sequences sent from Alice and Bob in Step 2 and performs measurements 
on the sequences to retrieve the private keys 
AK  and BK . Then, she sends the fake 
quantum sequences which have the same values with Eve’s measurement results instead 
in hope to pass the eavesdropping check of the Public Discussion Stage. However, Eve 
has no idea about the positions of the decoy particles as well as the measurement bases 
of the sequences. For each decoy particle in one of the four polarization states 
 0 ,  1 ,  ,    , there is a probability of 3
4
 that a participant can get the correct 
measurement result even if Eve accidentally measures it (in the Z-basis or X-basis). 
Therefore, Eve will pass the public discussion with a significant probability in Step 3. 
However, if there are numerous decoy particles (denote the number as l ) suffering 
from Eve’s attack, the probability that Eve can pass the check has become 
3
4
l
 
 
 
. In 
other words, Eve will be detected with a probability closed to 1 if the number l  is 
large enough. 
b. Correlation-Elicitation Attack  
In case of Correlation-Elicitation (CE) attack, the eavesdropper Eve may try to 
intercept *
AS
  and *
BS
  as the controlled photons and subsequently prepares some 
auxiliary photons as the target photons, to obtain the useful information of Alice and 
Bob’s private key. For example, Eve entangles her auxiliary photons with *
AS
  by 
performing the controlled-NOT (CNOT) operation on each two photons, i.e. use one 
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photon of *
AS
  to be the control bit and use a qubit in the state of 0  to be the target 
bit. If the control bit is in Z-basis, we cannot detect this attack. Because in this case the 
control bit cannot be changed by the CNOT operation. And if the control bit is in X-
basis, we have the probability of 
1
2
 to detect the eavesdropping. Because in this case, 
the control bit has been entangled with the target bit. Obviously, there is the probability 
of 
1
2
  to get the same measurement result of the control bit as before and the 
probability of 
1
2
 to get a different measurement result. Overall, for one decoy photon, 
the detection rate is 
1
4
. Hence, the probability that Eve can pass the check is 
3
4
l
 
 
 
, 
which means that Eve will be detected with a probability closed to 1 if the number l  
is large enough. 
c. Information Leakage Analysis   
The security of the final shared key is very important for the participants, and 
information leakage is a kind of passive attack that enables Eve to extract the secret key 
from the measurement results. In the following, we demonstrate that the proposed QKA 
can prevent the information leakage problem. 
In the proposed protocol, if Eve wants to eavesdrop any useful information, he 
must intercepts the *
AS
  and *
BS
  in Step 2. Similar as the analysis of Intercept and 
Resend Attack, for one bit, the probability for Eve to obtain the correct measurement 
result is 
3
4
 . Hence, the measurement result of one qubit contains 
2 2
3 3
1 log 1 log
4 4
i ip p   2
1 1
log 0.1887
4 4
    bit of information. That means, 
according to the measurement results, Eve can obtain about 18.87% of Alice and Bob’s 
private key. However, the analysis of Intercept and Resend Attack shows that this 
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attack can be detected in the Step 3. Moreover, in the Step 7, the privacy amplification 
can ensure there is no information leakage in the proposed protocol. For example, if we 
assume the privacy amplification remains 80% of the raw key K  to be the final secret 
key K . In other words, the reduced part is 20% which larger than 18.87%. Obviously, 
the proposed quantum key agreement protocol is free from information leakage. 
3.3.2 Security against insider attack 
This study points out that most of the QKAs suffer from the key manipulation 
problem as discussed in Section 2. Now we propose several possible scenarios to prove 
that our QKA can resist such an insider attack. In other words, the proposed protocol 
can achieve the strong fairness property. 
First, suppose that there is a legitimate but malicious participant, Bob, who wants 
to control the shared key in his favor. After receiving the positions and the bases of the 
decoy particles from Alice in Step 3, Bob can draw the sequences 
AS
  and 
AC  from 
*
AS
  and *AC  respectively. However, Bob has no idea about the original order of AS   
and the measurement bases. He cannot efficiently extract Alice’s private key AK  and 
get any useful information from 
AS
  and AC  at this step. Thus, what Bob can do is 
only to follow the protocol and complete the public discussion honestly. 
Second, consider that Bob tries to learn a little part of AK . In the extreme case, 
merely one bit. In Step 3, after extracting the sequences 
AS
  and AC  according to 
Alice’s announcement, Bob directly measures a particle of 
AS
  in the Z-basis or X-
basis at random). In this case, there is a probability of 
3
4
 that he can derive a correct 
bit of AK . However, the particles of the sequence AS   have been randomly reordered 
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by Alice. Even if Bob gets a correct key bit, he still does not know which position that 
the bit belongs in AK . Therefore, Bob cannot accurately learn any bit of AK . 
Third, after Alice and Bob complete the public discussion in Step 3, they can 
confirm the channel is free from the eavesdropping attacks. It indicates that the 
eavesdropper is eliminated in the protocol. Under this assumption, assume that Alice 
first announces the original order and corresponding measurement bases to Bob. In this 
case, Bob can immediately produce AK  and further derive the shared secret key (by 
A BK K ). Once Bob does not prefer the shared key, he will try to modify his own key 
BK  by announcing a fake order to Alice. However, Alice will definitely get incorrect 
BK
  and the error will be detected in Step 5. As a consequence, Alice can reasonably 
deduce that Bob reports a wrong permutation to change the shared key. Bob’s 
illegitimate operation will be caught by Alice. 
3.4 Strong Fairness 
Section 3.1 described how to achieve the strong fairness property in a QKA. In the 
case of our proposed scheme, participants cannot obtain any useful information (other 
participants’ private keys or hash values) to derive the final shared secret key until the 
public discussion finished. Hence, according to the proposed solution model, if a 
malicious participant tries to deliberately abort the protocol to manipulate the final key, 
then with a high probability he/she would be detected by the other participant. 
 
4 Conclusion 
This paper has pointed out that, according to the ISO/IEC DIS 11770-3, the existing 
definition of ‘fairness’ in QKAs is not rigorous and proposed the definition of the weak 
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fairness property and the strong fairness property. Besides, most of the existing QKAs 
suffer from the key manipulation problem, which further causes these protocols unable 
to satisfy the strong fairness property. In this regard, we have proposed a model which 
provides a way of designing a QKA with the strong fairness property. Furthermore, we 
have presented a two-party QKA based on the solution model. Security analysis shows 
that the proposed QKA is secure against both the outsider and insider attacks, and also 
can avoid the key manipulation problem. Moreover, the same strategy described in 
Section 2.2 can also be applied to the construction of fair probabilistic quantum key 
distribution [43]. 
Finally, it is noteworthy to mention an issue which should be considered in the 
proposed two-party QKA. In Step 4 of the protocol, even the misconduct of the 
malicious participant, Bob, will certainly be detected by Alice in the protocol, Alice has 
no way to prove Bob’s misconduct to a third person. As a consequence, this dispute 
cannot be solved adequately. Hence, how to solve this problem will be an interesting 
open problem.  
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